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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant
to Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated, as an appeal from a
final Order and Judgment of a District Court.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1.

What legal standard is applicable to a

consideration of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict?
2.

Do the facts of this case meet the legal

standards for granting a JNOV?
3.

Was the jury's verdict of no cause of action

supported by any substantial evidence?
4.

May punitive damages be awarded in a case in

which defendant's actions were all taken in accordance with the
advice of counsel and in which no evidence of the relative
wealth of the parties was presented?
CONTROLLING RULES, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
This appeal rests substantially on Rule 50(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
For the convenience of the Court, citations to the
court record will be referred to as "R";

citations to the

transcript of the trial will be referred to as "T"; and the

transcript of the hearing on plaintiff1s motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict as "T of H".
A.

General Nature of the Case.
This action arises from a worker's compensation claim

filed by plaintiff's husband, James Turner.

The claim was

adjusted by defendant General Adjustment Bureau, Inc. (GAB).
GAB became suspicious of the validity of the claim and employed
Inteldex Corporation (Inteltech) to investigate.
An under cover investigation was conducted.
Inteltech investigators appeared at Mr. Turner's worker's
compensation hearing and testified regarding what they had
learned.

Upon questioning by the administrative law judge,

both Mr. and Mrs. Turner affirmed that everything the Inteltech
people had testified to was true.
Following the worker's compensation hearing and a
denial of Mr. Turner's claim for benefits, Mr. and Mrs. Turner
sued GAB, Inteltech, and certain Inteltech employees.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
As initially filed, plaintiff's Complaint included a

number of claims that were dismissed before trial.

All of Mr.

Turner's claims against all defendants were voluntarily
dismissed.

(R. 894-896.)
The trial proceeded upon plaintiff's claim for fraud,

invasion of privacy, conspiracy and punitive damages.

At the

close of evidence, plaintiff's claims against two Inteltech
employees, Ronnie Hyer and Denis Dye, were also voluntarily
dismissed.

(T. 894-896.)
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Trial by jury took place March 12-14, 1990.
Following deliberations, the jury returned a unanimous verdict
in favor of defendants.

It answered the special verdict form

questions as follows:
1.

By clear and convincing evidence, did
the defendant Inteltech commit fraud
upon the plaintiff, Jackie Turner, as
that cause of action has been
explained in these instructions?

ANSWER:
2.

No.

By a preponderance of the evidence,
did the defendant Inteltech invade the
privacy of the plaintiff Jackie Turner
as that cause of action has been
explained in these instructions?

ANSWER:

No.

R. 721-722.
Following the jury's verdict, plaintiff moved for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial.
4, 1990, the matter was argued before the Court.

On May

Judge

Wilkinson denied the motion for new trial but granted the
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

(R. 813.)

The Court entered judgment against GAB, Inteltech and Oak
Norton jointly and severally for the following damages:
Out-of-Pocket Damages:

$

20.00

General Damages

5,000.00

Punitive Damages

3,000.00

Total Damages

8,020.00
(R. 890-982.)
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Workerfs Compensation Claim
1.

GAB was the adjusting company handling Mr.

Turner's worker's compensation claim.

By September of 1986,

the adjuster in charge had become suspicious of the validity of
the claims due to conflicts between the medical reports and
what the Turners were telling the adjuster.

(T. 133, 215,

233-234.)
2.

In September of 1986, GAB employed Inteltech

to investigate Mr. Turner.
3.

(T. 133.)

Mrs. Turner had been involved with the

worker's compensation claim from the start.

She was the one

who had filled out the original claim form (T. 3 05), she had
numerous conversations with the GAB adjusters regarding the
claim (T. 235, 259, 291), she even picked up checks from GAB
for interim compensation payments (T. 3 06).
4.

Mrs. Turner admitted at trial that she told

GAB at least some things that were not true regarding her
husband's condition.

She told them that he was unable to work

at a time when he was working.
5.

(T. 291-292.)

Mrs. Turner was also a very active

participant in the worker's compensation hearing.

She was

there for the entire hearing, offered tesitmony herself, and
participated in her husband's testimony as well.
6.

(T. 306-307.)

Inteltech conducted the investigation of Mr.

Turner's claim from October 1986 through December 1986.
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Inteltech representatives also offered testimony at the
worker's compensation hearing.

Mrs. Turner conceded that the

Inteltech representatives testified honestly and truthfully at
the worker's compensation hearing.
8.

(T. 294, 304.)

Mrs. Turner was very upset at the hearing,

however, because she believed other witnesses who had been
called by Mr. Turner's employer had lied.

(T. 286.)

The

Administrative law judge decided the hearing adversely to Mr.
Turner, denying his claim for additional compensation.

(T.

290.)

Investigation
9.

Inteltech's investigation of Mr. Turner

involved six occasions on which the Turners were contacted. All
of these contacts were handled by Ron Hyer, an Inteltech
investigator.

(T. 131.)

The specific times of contact were

delineated on Exhibit 3 and on the business records of
Inteltech admitted as Exhibit 2.

There were five visits with

Mrs. Turner present ranging in length from 17 minutes to 34
minutes.
Turner.

There was also one telephone conference with Mrs.
The total time involved when Mr. Hyer spoke with Mrs.

Turner was 2 hours 8 minutes.

Of this time, Mr. Turner was

present for all but 51 minutes.
10.

In accordance with company policy, Mr. Hyer

did not introduce himself as a private investigator.
object was to obtain candid information.

He used the cover of

a door-to-door market testing representative.
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His

He offered the

Turners a number of products to test on a voluntary basis.
They accepted and appreciated the receipt of these products.
(T. 166.)

All of the products were free to the Turners.
11.

the Turners.

Mr. Hyer was always friendly and courteous to

(T. 166, 265, 303.)

home uninvited.

(T. 161.)

leave or not return.

Mr. Hyer never came into the

Mrs. Turner never requested that he

(T. 302-303.)

She understood that she

did not have any obligation to continue receiving products.
(T. 311.)
12.

The pretext of market testing was used in

this case simply as a cover so that candid conversation could
occur.

Inteltech
13.
by Oak Norton.

Inteltech is an investigation company formed
It provides investigation services to insurance

companies in investigation of questionable worker's
compensation or liability claims.

It also does undercover work

for corporations in investigating internal theft and
embezzlement.

(T. 114.)
14.

Inteltech has previously been employed by a

number of State and Federal agencies, including the Utah State
Insurance Fund.
15.

(T. 101, 115, 119.)
Inteltech has used the pretext of market

testing as a cover for a number of years.

Before conducting

such investigations, it received legal advice from attorneys
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both in its home state of Pennsylvania and in Utah indicating
that this technique is lawful.
16.

(T. 103, 112, 118.)

It is Inteltech's job when hired to do a

pretext investigation to gather facts and if requested take
moving pictures of a claimant.

Inteltech does not make a

recommendation regarding what should be done.

(T. 123.)

Accordingly, in this case as well, no specific recommendation
was given, other than to report observations of Mr. Turner
working.

(T. 235.)
17.

In this particular investigation, the

attorney involved for the company was aware and gave some
direction regarding investigation.

(T. 23 6, 237.)

Claimed Injury
18.

Mrs. Turner made no claim of any physical

injury resulting from this investigation.
make a claim of financial injury.

She attempted to

She claimed that she was

employed at the time of the investigation and that her
conversations with Mr. Hyer took her away from gainful
employment.
272.)

She claimed a wage rate of $6 per hour.

(T.

On cross examination, however, it was clear that Mrs.

Turner did not have a paying job.

She assisted a landlord in

managing some apartments and received credit toward rent.
298.)

She worked on a very flexible schedule.

(T.

It was also

clear that at the times Mr. Hyer met with her, she was not at
work or leaving for work.
landlord at night.

She normally did the work for the

(T. 268.)
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19.

Mrs. Turner also claimed that on one occasion

she had lined up a babysitter anticipating a visit from Mr.
Hyer and some more involved product testing.

She did not

identify the babysitter, she simply estimated that she paid the
babysitter "20 bucks or something like that."

(T. 272.)

When

the meeting with Mr. Hyer was cancelled, she offered no
explanation as to why she did not cancel the babysitter.
20.

Mrs. Turner's primary claim for damages was

for emotional distress.

She claimed that the realization that

Mr. Hyer was an investigator had caused her to feel betrayed
and angry.

(T. 274.)

She claimed that she was upset

immediately following the worker's compensastion hearing where
she learned of Mr. Hyer's true employment.
21.

(T. 275.)

This testimony was contradicted by the

testimony of her husband, Mr. Turner.

Mr. Turner testified

that she didn't seem particularly upset or abnormal at all
following the worker's compensation hearing when she learned of
Mr. Hyer's involvement.

To the contrary, he didn't notice an

emotional change in her until several years after the hearing
occurred.

(T. 197-198.)

Mrs. Turner's Credibility
22.

In addition to the conflict with her

husband's testimony, other testimony raising questions about
her credibility was as follows:
a.

Mrs. Turner testified repeatedly that the

investigation by Inteltech had started much earlier
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than the records demonstrated it had and involved
visits of much more frequency and more duration than
the records showed.
b.

(T. 263, 281, 295.)

Mrs. Turner herself admitted that she had

been experiencing severe psychological problems
throughout her life which were totally unrelated to
any investigation.

Her family history includes many

tragic episodes of rape, incest, child abuse, and
severe marital discord.

She herself testified that

her memory was not accurate.
c.

(T. 277, 314, 316, 317.)

Mrs. Turner conceded that she had falsely

told GAB that her husband was not working when, in
fact, he was.
d.

(T. 291-292.)

Dr. Mark Rindflesh, a psychiatrist who

had reviewed her psychological history, gave his
opinion that the many stress factors in her life were
the source of any emotional problems she was having,
not the few visits that she had had with Mr. Hyer.
He also pointed out that her psychiatric records
indicated she was unable to accurately relate her
condition and situation and accurately give
historical information.
e.

(T. 385-389.)

Dr. Rindflesh further pointed out that at

the time of the investigation and the hearing, when
any psychological problems should have been
occurring, Mrs. Turner made no reference to those
events with a therapist and, in fact, since that time
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has never mentioned those circumstances to any of her
several counselors.

(T. 380-381.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I
A JNOV MAY NOT BE GRANTED IF THERE IS ANY COMPETENT
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE VERDICT.
A trial court may only grant a JNOV if it finds that
there was no competent evidence supporting the jury's
verdict.

All evidence presented at trial must be viewed in the

light most favorable to the party prevailing on the jury's
verdict.
On appeal of an order granting a JNOV, the appellate
court must make the same analysis from the record and should
not give deference to the determination of the trial court.

As

applied in the instant case, Judge Wilkinson's JNOV Order may
only be upheld if there is no credible evidence whatsoever to
suggest that plaintiff failed to prove any of the elements of
her causes of action.
POINT II
THE JURY'S VERDICT FINDING NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
FRAUD IS WELL SUPPORTED IN THE EVIDENCE.
It is the plaintiff's burden in a fraud case to prove
all of the nine elements of fraud by clear and convincing
evidence.

One of the elements requires the proof of pecuniary

injury or damage.

Plaintiff's evidence of pecuniary injury in

this case was highly deficient and suspect and certainly does
not reach the standard of clear and convincing evidence.
-10-

The

jury's verdict denying recovery for fraud is well supported
based upon the lack of damage evidence.
In addition, a review of the other elements of a
fraud claim makes clear that this is not a case of fraud.
While plaintiff has been able to pick certain elements of fraud
and point to misrepresentations, this is simply not a fraud
case.

Fraud is an economic tort based upon misrepresentations

inducing a person into a contract.

There was no contract in

this case that was not fully performed by Inteltech when it
delivered the various free products that were promised to
plaintiff.
POINT III
THE JURY'S VERDICT FINDING NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INVASION
OF PRIVACY WAS WELL SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Under the law, it is plaintiff's burden to prove that
her privacy was invaded and that the intrusion was "substantial
and would be highly offensive to a reasonable person".

The

jury's conclusion that plaintiff failed to prove this element
is well supported.
five occasions.
minutes.

Plaintiff only had met with Inteltech on

The total time involved was 2 hours and 8

Inteltech's representatives were at all times

courteous and friendly.

There was no harassment, disparagement

or other abuse of any kind.
other invasions.

There was no bugging, peeping or

The evidence fully supports the jury's

conclusion that any intrusion was not highly offensive or
substantial.

Such a determination is clearly within the

special province of a jury.
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Furthermore, the Turners, by making a worker's
compensation claim, impliedly consented to a full and
reasonable investigation of that claim.

The jury found that

the investigation techniques used by Inteltech were
reasonable.

There was no evidence presented to suggest a

contrary finding.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF
A PUNITIVE DAMAGE CLAIM.
Two of the essential elements to a punitive damage
claim are:

(1)

Proof of malice or reckless disregard on the

part of defendant, and (2) proof of defendant's wealth.
Plaintiff offered no evidence to support either of these
elements.
Defendants' testimony was unopposed and established
that prior to using their investigation techniques, defendants
received opinions from several attorneys regarding the legality
of those techniques.

Those attorneys all advised that the

techniques were appropriate and complied with the law.

As

such, defendants' actions cannot be found to be in reckless
disregard of the law.

In fact, defendants went out of their

way to determine that their actions complied with the law.
Furthermore, plaintiff simply failed to put on any
evidence as to the wealth of defendants.

Such evidence is a

necessary element of any punitive damage claim.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JURY'S VERDICT OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION MAY NOT BE
REVERSED BY A JNOV UNLESS THERE IS NO COMPETENT
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE VERDICT.
The granting of a JNOV reversing a jury's verdict is
a drastic remedy which may only be used in the clearest of
cases.

This Court has repeatedly stated that a JNOV may only

be granted if there is a total absence of competent evidence
supporting the verdict.

King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah

1987); Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693 (Utah 1982).
Conversely, if any competent evidence, or reasonable inference
from competent evidence, supports the jury's verdict, a JNOV
should not be granted.
As with a summary judgment motion, a JNOV motion
raises a legal issue as to the presence or absence of any
competent evidence supporting a particular proposition.

As

such, on appeal, the appellate court should not pay deference
to the determination of the trial judge, but rather must make
its own independent review of the record applying the same
standards that should have been applied at the trial court
level.

King v. Fereday, supra.
In the case of Mel Hardman Productions, Inc. v.

Robinson, 604 P.2d 913 (Utah 1979), this Court specifically
cautioned against a trial court's substitution of its own
feelings or reactions to evidence for that of the jury.
Court commented:

-13-

The

As we have numerous times indicated, the
right of trial by jury is one which should
be carefully safeguarded by the courts, and
when a party had demanded such a trial, he
is entitled to have the benefit of the
jury's findings on issues of fact; and it
is not the trial court's prerogative to
disregard or nullify them by making
findings of his own. Therefore, in ruling
on the motions which take issues of fact
from the jury (this includes both motions
for directed verdict and for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict), the trial
court is obliged to look at all the
evidence and all reasonable inferences that
fairly may be drawn therefrom in the light
favorable to the party moved against; and
the granting of such a motion is justified
only if, in so viewing the evidence, there
is no substantial basis therein which would
support a verdict in his favor. On
appeal, in considering the trial court's
granting of such motions, we look at the
evidence in the same manner. (Emphasis
added.)
As applied to the instant case, Judge Wilkinson's
JNOV order may be upheld if and only if there is no credible
evidence or question as to whether plaintiff proved all of the
elements of her causes of action for fraud, invasion of privacy
and punitive damages.
POINT II
THE JURY'S VERDICT FINDING NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
FRAUD IS WELL SUPPORTED IN THE EVIDENCE.
This Court has delineated the elements that must be
shown in establishing fraud in the case of Mikkelson v. Quail
Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124 (Utah 1982) as follows:
To maintain a cause of action for fraud,
plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence the existence of each
of the following elements:
1. That a representation was made;
-14-

2. Concerning a presently existing
material fact;
3. Which was false;
4. Which the representer either (a)
knew to be false or (b) made
recklessly knowing that he had
insufficient knowledge upon which
to base such a representation;
5. For the purpose of inducing the
other party to act upon it;
6. That the other party acted
reasonably and in ignorance of its
falsity;
7. Did in fact rely upon it;
8. Was thereby induced to act;
9. To his injury and damage.
In Mrs. Turner's case, several of these elements are
lacking.

Most clearly, plaintiff has not suffered any "injury

and damage" as required for a fraud action.
Fraud is a cause of action for economic loss,

It

compensates injured parties for out of pocket losses resulting
from deceit.

In the instant case, plaintiff's allegations are

simply that she had conversations with Mr. Hyer when Mr. Hyer
had misrepresented his true employment.

Her allegations of

emotional upset are insufficient to support a cause of action
or fraud.

In casting about to find some out of pocket damage,

plaintiff's claims of the loss of $20 for a babysitter and some
unspecified amount of income simply failed to meet the clear
and convincing standard.
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A.

Emotional Damages Are Not Recoverable in Fraud.
In the case of Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 682 P.2d 1247

(Ida. 1983), the Idaho Supreme Court reversed that portion of a
judgment which awarded damages for mental distress in a fraud
case.

The Court stated:
The general rule is that recovery cannot
be had for mental anguish in fraud cases.
As stated in 37 CJS Fraud, Section 141(f)
1943: "recovery cannot be had in an action
for deceit for injury to plaintiff's
feelings and public disgrace incurred
through being deceived through false
representations, or for anxiety, worry, and
harrassment arising from fraud, or from
annoyance or inconvenience." A number of
jurisdictions follow this or a similar
rule. See, e.g., Moore v. Slonim,
426
F.Supp. 524 (D.C.Conn.), afffd, 562 F.2d 38
(2nd Cir. 1977) (Damages for mental
distress not ordinarily available in a
cause of action for business fraud);
Kantor v. Comet Press Books Corp., 187
F.Supp., 321 (S.D. N.Y. 1960) (damages for
mental anguish not recoverable in action
for fraud); Sierra National Bank v.
Brown, 18 Cal.App.3d 98, 95 Cal. Rptr. 742
(1971) (mental distress not an element of
damages for fraud); Chandler v. Ziegler,
88 Colo. 1, 291 P.822 (1930) (instruction
allowing inconvenience held to constitute
reversible error); Ellis v. Crockett, 51
Hawaii 45, 451 P.2d 814 (1969) (in cases of
fraud, there may be no recovery for mental
anguish or humiliation not intentionally
inflicted); Harsche v. Czyz, 157 Neb.
699, 61 N.W.2d 265 (1953) (in an action for
fraud, instruction permitting recovery for
mental anguish and humiliation constituted
prejudicial error).

682 P.2d at 1258-59 (Emphasis added).
See also, Ellis v. Crockett, 451 P.2d 814 (Hawaii
1969) upholding the dismissal of a fraud complaint seeking
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mental suffering damages.

There, the Hawaiian Supreme Court

stated:
In order to have a claim based on deceit,
the plaintiff must have suffered
substantial actual damage, not nominal or
speculative. (Prosser, Law on Torts, at
748, 3rd Ed. 1964.) The courts have often
expressed this requirement in terms of
pecuniary damage . . .
Pecuniary damages, being narrow in scope,
are those damages (either general or
special, which can accurately be calculated
in monetary terms such as loss of wages and
cost of medical expenses. In fraud or
deceit cases, the measure of pecuniary
damages is usually confined to either the
"out of pocket" loss fcitation] or the
"benefit of the bargain" . . .
451 P.2d at 820 (Emphasis added).
B.

Plaintiff's Damage Evidence Was Deficient.
Damages, like all other elements of a cause of action

for fraud are required to be proved by clear and convincing
evidence.

The evidence presented by plaintiff at trial was

anything but clear and convincing.
Pecuniary Damage.

With regard to the pecuniary

loss plaintiff claimed, her evidence was almost non-existent.
She alleged at various times that she had lost time from work.
However, she was unable to put any dollar figure on the amount
of work lost.

She only said that she spent some time with Ron

Hyer and that people at S.O.S. got $6 per hour.

She failed to

indicate how, if at all, the time she spent with Ron Hyer
affected the rent credit that she was earning from her
landlord.

Her discussion of her various conferences with Mr.

Hyer made clear that most if not all of them did not involve
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loss of work, whatsoever.

On one occasion, she had been

sleeping during the day.
friend's house.

On another occasion, she was at a

On several other occasions, she had young

children home with her and clearly was not going off to do any
work.

Having failed to provide any specification of time

involved, jobs missed, or rate of pay at any of the jobs,
plaintiff's claims of lost income damages certainly fails the
clear and convincing test.
Plaintiff's other claim of pecuniary loss related to
babysitting service.

In this case, once again, she failed to

give any specification.
whom she had paid.
been paid.
that."

She failed to identify a babysitter

She also was unclear as to exactly what had

She merely stated "2 0 bucks or something like

She gave no explanation as to why, when the meeting

with Ron Hyer was cancelled in advance, she failed to similarly
cancel her babysitter.
questionable.

At best, the evidence was

It certainly was not clear and convincing.

Emotional Damages.

If emotional damages were to be

considered, plaintiff's testimony regarding her emotional
damages was similarly seriously deficient.

Nothwithstanding

the fact that plaintiff was residing in a psychiatric hospital
at the time of trial and apparently receiving regular
psychological treatment, plaintiff failed to present a single
psychologist, psychiatrist or therapist to explain any sort of
emotional harm that had been caused to her by the
investigation.

Plaintiff's own description of her emotional

reaction to the investigation was brief and unconvincing.
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She

stated simply "I felt that a friend had betrayed me.

And I

felt that my time I cherished and my hospitality had been
violated."

(T. 274.)

Later, she stated she was "angry, very

very angry" when she learned of the investigation.

(T. 276.)

The evidence was unrebutted that she had sought no
care of any kind for her claimed emotional distress.

In fact,

although she was regularly receiving treatment from therapists
and psychologists she had not mentioned this matter to any of
them.

None of the notes regarding her treatment made any

reference to this investigation or her reaction to it.
The only witness plaintiff presented in an attempt to
corroborate any psychological injury was her husband, Mr.
Turner.

As noted in the Fact Statement, Mr. Turner was

damaging to her allegations of emotional distress.

Mr. Turner

contradicted his wife's testimony that she had been emotionally
distraught just after the learning of the investigation. Mr.
Turner specifically stated that she was her normal self
following the hearing when she learned about the
investigation.

(T. 197.)

He further pointed out that she did

not seem to have the various problems with trust and invasion
of privacy until years after learning of the investigation.
summing up his testimony, Mr. Turner stated:
QUESTION: But in the last year you have
noticed some things?
ANSWER:
more.

I know she don't trust nobody no

QUESTION: And you understand that is
related to the Industrial Commission
hearing.

-19-

In

ANSWER:

No.

T. 199.
C.

Plaintiff Was Not Credible.
Plaintiff's evidence supporting any emotional harm or

pecuniary loss was scanty at best and certainly not rising to
the level of clear and convincing.

In addition, however,

there is the issue of plaintiff's credibility.
conflicted with that of her husband.

Her testimony

She also admitted that

she had given false information to GAB about her husband's
employment.

Additionally, her testimony about the number,

timing and duration of the visits with Ron Hyer was
contradicted by the records.

Finally, her own psychiatric

treatment records and the analysis of Dr. Mark Rindflesh show
that she was inaccurate in her recollections and inaccurate in
her analysis of her emotional state.
The jury had received Instruction No. 5 which stated:
If you believe any witness has willfully
testified falsely as to any material
matter, you may disregard the entire
testimony of such witness, except as he may
have been corroborated by other credible
evidence. (R. 676.)
They also received Instruction 10 as follows:
If you should find that it was within the
power of a party to produce stronger and
more satisfactory evidence than that which
was offered on a material point, you may
view with distrust any weaker and less
satisfactory evidence actually offered by
him on that point, unless such failure is
satisfactorily explained. (R. 681.)
Applying these two instructions, the jury's verdict
that fraud damages were not proved by clear and convincing
-20-

evidence is strongly supported.

There can be no doubt that

Mrs. Turner did testify falsely with regard to some issues.
There further can be no doubt that her evidence of damage was
grossly inadequate.

There was no reason that she could not

have given more specific information regarding whatever
payments and losses she claims she incurred.

There similarly

was no reason presented that she could not have brought in one
of her treating psychiatrists to explain how this investigation
had affected her life.

The fact is that she had no such

evidence to present.

D.

Other Necessary Factors for A Fraud Claim Were Lacking.
In addition to the lack of damages sufficient to

support a claim of fraud, any analysis of the remaining
elements of fraud points out the fundamental inappropriateness
of attempting to make a claim of fraud under these facts. Were
the representations material?

The question of materiality of

representations in a fraud context is considered in terms of
the inducement to enter into a transaction.
Crocket, supra.

See Ellis v.

In this case, no transactions were entered

into regarding the investigation.

The only transactions were

that Mrs. Turner was promised delivery of certain free
products, all of which she received.

Mrs. Turner received

everything that was promised by Mr. Hyer.

Using the

transactional analysis as is appropriate for fraud,
representations made to plaintiff regarding compensation were
all true.
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This case is simply not a fraud case.

While

plaintiff has been able to pick elements of fraud and point to
misrepresentation, this is not a fraud case.

Nothing was taken

from plaintiff and no pecuniary loss is involved.

Defendants

provided free products exactly as promised.
POINT III
THE JURY'S VERDICT FINDING NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INVASION
OF PRIVACY WAS WELL SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The Court's instruction to the jury regarding
invasion of privacy was based upon the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, Section 652(b) and Comment D.

The instruction, to

which plaintiff took no exception, read as follows:
In this case, the plaintiff Jackie Turner
claims that the defendants have invaded her
privacy. In order to find that defendants
have invaded the plaintiff's privacy, you
must find, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that:
1. The defendants intentionally intruded
upon the solitude or seclusion of the
plaintiff or her private affairs or
concerns; and
2. That the intrusion was substantial and
would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.
In this case, the jury's conclusion that plaintiff
had failed to prove invasion of privacy under this standard was
well supported.

There is substantial and credible evidence

that the intrusion involved was not substantial and would not
be highly offensive to a reasonable person.

Furthermore, there

is substantial evidence supporting the fact that Mr. and Mrs.
Turner had jointly waived certain rights of privacy to the
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extent of a reasonable investigation of the worker's
compensation claim.
A.

Any Intrusion was Insubstantial and Not Highly Offensive.
Although plaintiff testified at trial that she was

visited 10 to 15 times by Mr. Hyer, that testimony was directly
contradicted by the testimony of Mr. Hyer and Inteltech's
business records.

The Inteltech records showed that Mrs.

Turner only met on five occasions with Mr. Hyer.
also one brief phone call.

There was

The total time Mrs. Turner spent

with Mr. Hyer was 2 hours and 8 minutes.

During all but two of

the visits, Mr. Turner was present as well.
On each occasion, Mr. Hyer had been invited into the
home either by Mrs. Turner or a member of her family.
visit was cordial and friendly.

Each

Mr. Hyer never insisted on

staying after being asked to leave, nor did he act in any way
other than a courteous and friendly manner.

Those visits which

were at Mrs. Turner's home occurred in her front room or
kitchen.

She received a number of free products in connection

with the visits.

There were no late-night visits, no

late-night telephone calls—nothing calculated to harass or
annoy whatsoever.
The jury evidently concluded that these few visits of
short duration were not a substantial instrusion.

Furthermore,

they would not be "highly offensive" to a reasonable person.
The issues of reasonableness and the degree of
intrusion are clearly issues of fact within the special
province of the jury.

Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780
-23-

P.2d 821 (Utah App. 1989).

The jury brings to the issue of the

degree of offensiveness and the degree of any intrusion the
unique perspective of eight individuals from the community
acting as reasonable persons.
unanimous.

The jury in this case was

Judge Wilkinson's substitution of his personal

thoughts towards these jury issues cannot be supported under
these circumstances.

The contacts between Mr. Hyer and

plaintiff are simply too few and minor and inoffensive to
justify ignoring the unanimous decision of eight jurors.

B.

Waiver.
When a person such as Mr. Turner makes a claim for

worker's compensation benefits, he impliedly consents to a full
investigation of the claim.

This includes more than just

interviewing the claimant as to his side of the story and his
evaluation of his own injuries.

Case law makes clear that the

company has the right to place the claimant under surveillance
and to make reasonable investigation.

Ellenberg v.

Pinckerton's, Inc., 188 S.E.2d 911 (Ga. App. 1972); 62
Am.Jur.2d, Privacy, § 41; and Forster v. Manchester, 180 A.2d
147 (Penn. 1963).
In the Forster case, for example, plaintiff claimed
that an investigation in which she was filmed violated her
rights to privacy.

Plaintiff had become aware of the

investigation while it was ongoing and was disturbed by it.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's claim,
commenting:
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. . . We feel that there is much social
utility to be gained from these
investigations. It is in the best interest
of society that valid claims be ascertained
and fabricated claims be exposed.
*

*

*

Although we sympathize with the plight of
the appellant, the social value resulting
from the investigations of personal injury
claims and the absence of any wilfullness
on the part of appellee require us to deny
redress in this case.
189 A.2d at 150, 152.
Plaintiff herself recognizes that such investigations
can be appropriate.

(T. 276.)

The expert plaintiff presented

as a witness in this case similarly acknowledged that
surveillance is an appropriate technique for an insurance
company and further that he himself had recommended
surveillance in certain cases.
247.)

(Testimony, LeRoy Johnson, T.

The validity of any investigation or surveillance

necessarily relies upon candid observation and responses. As
pointed out by Ron Hyer, a private investigator seeking candid
observations cannot inform the claimant that he is being
observed.

(T. 181-182.)
In this case, plaintiff argued that she was not the

claimant on the worker's compensation matter and, therefore,
had waived nothing.

This was apparently the basis for Judge

Wilkinson's decision to overturn the jury verdict.

(T. of H.,

20.)
The facts, however, do not support this position.
Although Mrs. Turner was not the direct worker's compensation
claimant, she clearly had a personal and financial interest in
-25-

the claim.

She was acting as her husband's advisor in filing

the claim and in working with the various insurance adjusters.
She personally went down to receive money from GAB on the
claim.

She personally gave GAB information which she hoped

supported the claim.

She personally filled out the original

claim form itself.
It is simply not possible to investigate a claim
being made by a spouse in a household and not at the same time
have some contact or observation of other persons residing in
that household.

Mrs. Turner was a very significant part of of

the worker's compensation claim as well as her husband.

The

fact that the investigator had some insubstantial contact with
her while investigating Mr. Turner does not justify overturning
the jury's verdict.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
A.

Defendant Acted in Good Faith and With
Concern for the Rights of Others.
This action arose before the passage of Section

78-18-1, Utah Code Annotated.

Accordingly, the issue of

punitive damages was determined under common law as existing
prior to the passage of Section 78-18-1.
Case law permits the awarding of punitive damages
only in a case where the defendant's conduct "is willful and
malicious or manifests a knowing and reckless disregard toward
and disregard of, the rights of others.
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Johnson v. Rogers,

763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988).

In this case, there was no evidence

supporting a finding of malice or such reckless indifference.
There was no suggestion in the evidence of any malice
or ill will carried by any defendant regarding Mrs. Turner or
her husband.
friendly.

To the contrary, all contacts were pleasant and

None of the Inteltech people had any previous

knowledge or acquaintance with the Turners.
In addition, there was no evidence whatsoever of a
reckless indifference towards Mrs. Turner's rights. The
testimony of Oak Norton was unopposed regarding the legal
advice he had sought and received prior to utilizing the
investigation techniques involved.

Mr. Norton consulted with

attorneys in the State of Pennsylvania and Utah.

He further

was aware of legal review being made by various clients.
Finally, in many cases, as in this one, the individual attorney
involved in the worker's compensation hearing was fully aware
of the investigation technique and apparently approved it.
Inteltech's obtaining legal opinion as to the techniques it
used cannot be considered "reckless".

To the contrary, its

conduct was proper and appropriate in making efforts to check
out the legal ramifications of its procedures before engaging
in them.
B.

Plaintiff Failed to Offer Evidence
of the Wealth of Defendants.
In addition, plaintiff failed to present evidence of

the relative wealth of the various defendants.

Such evidence

is a part of the case a plaintiff must present in a punitive
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damage action.

Arnica Mutual Insurance Co, v. Shettler, 768

P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989).
In the instant case, plaintiff failed to put on any
evidence as to the net worth or net income of any of the
defendants.

In view of this failure of evidence, punitive

damages cannot be awarded.

CONCLUSION
Following trial in this case, the jury returned a
unanimous verdict of no cause of action.

It found that no

fraud had been committed and that there was no actionable
invasion of privacy.

That verdict may only be overturned if

there is no competent evidence or inference from competent
evidence to support it. A review of the transcript makes clear
that there was more than adequate evidence to support the
jury's determination.

This determination involves questions of

reasonableness and outrageousness which are properly determined
by a jury.

Judge Wilkinson's granting of the JNOV motion was

an inappropriate rejection of the jury's deliberation.

Under

the standards established by this Court, it cannot be upheld.
This Court should reverse the Judge's JNOV Order and
remand the matter to the District Court with directions to
enter judgment of no cause of action in accord with the jury's
verdict.
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'"day of

/ - lUrtA
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COURT'S RULING

23

THE COURT:

Okay.

Ifm ready to rule.

24

Let me state this to you:

As I indicated at

25

the outset, of course, as you know, I heard the
19
I

1

1

evidence.

And I had feelings at the time and I have

2

feelings.

And I have reviewed this matter, and I was

3

more versed on the evidence right after the trial than I

4

am now; but I have reviewed it.

5

me the instructions that were given to the jury.

6

In fact, I got before

And I understand what you1re arguing and the

7

seriousness of what I am about to do.

And it seems

8

like that I can only remember one other case where I

9

have really modified a juryfs verdict, and that also

10

involved Mr. Schwab.

11

on it, too, because I didn't review it that well.

12

I got myself in a little hot water

But anyway, the Court is of the opinion that

13

the motion by the plaintiff for a Judgment

14

Notwithstanding the Verdict is well taken.

15

the opinion that no reasonable minds could have differed

16

on the evidence which was presented to them.

17

basing this on that Jackie Turner is not an individual

18

that's involved as far as the defendants are concerned

19

-- and I made this statement at trial a couple of times

20

-- as far as the defendants are concerned in making a

21

determination as to whether she is dishonest in

22

accepting money under an industrial claim.

23

not the person in that situation; she was the wife.

24

it was highly offensive to this Court for the defendants

25

to do what they did to Jackie Turner.

That I am of

That I am

That she was
And

20

The Court finds that all of the elements -and I can go through -- you are going to have to prepare
some findings of facts, but I can go through each one; I
am not going to just to save time unless somebody
insists on it -- I am saying that all nine elements of
fraud were met.

That the Court was of the opinion that

$20 was testified to.

That there was a lot of argument

on it but there was no strong cross examination that
that money was never spent by her.
And I will admit that other things were said
as far as time and things are concerned of which the
Court is not basing it on.

I think that is too

speculative, although I think her time was taken.
Anybodyfs time is of some value, so you can't make an
| argument as far as I am concerned.

But I am saying that

$20 was there.
|

The Court is also of the opinion that the
elements of invasion of privacy are there.

That the

defendants intentiona lly intruded upon the privacy and
solitude of the plain tiff, and as far as her private
affairs are concerned

And the intrusion was

substantial and highly offensive to a reasonable
person.

And that I am also of the opinion -- and I

don't know that this is really before me at this time -that the elements of conspiracy were proven as far as, I
21

1

guess, Inteltech and GAB.
And based on that, I am going to deny the

2
3

motion for a new trial.

But I am going to grant to the

4

plaintiff out-of-pocket damages of $20, general damages

5

of $5,000, punitive damages of $3,000, together with

6

reasonable attorney fees.
Now, I have not gone into or said anything

7

And I donft know if that's

8

about the agency concern.

9

something that I need to go into.
MR. BARLOW:

10

Well, your Honor, there was no

11

finding at all as to GAB.

12

just rendered against both defendants?
THE COURT:

13
14
15

Is this verdict that you have

Well, I guess that's what I was

asking.
MR. BARLOW:

There was no fraud claim or

16

invasion of privacy against GAB.

There was only a

17

conspiracy claim, which the Court has noted was not

18

before the Court on this motion, nor was it even reached

19

by the jury.

20

judgment notwithstanding the verdict since there was no

21

verdict on conspiracy.

So I don't know that the Court can enter

22

THE COURT:

What did happen to the conspiracy?

23

MR. BARLOW:

It was never reached because it

24

only could be obtained if there was a finding of fraud

25

or invasion of privacy.

That was a prerequisite
22

element.
2
3
4

THE COURT:

Thatf i3 right.

And I am now

finding f raud and invasion <Df privacy.
Then the Court must grant the

MR. BARLOW:

5

plaintiff 's motion for a new trial or dismiss GAB on the

6

conspirac y cl<aim.

7

THE COURT:

That's my question:

Whether I

8

then have the authori ty in finding the fraud and

9

invasion of p rivacy a nd finding conspiracy, and th en can

10

I find conspiracy and grant damages and a judgment for

11

it withou t a new tria 1?

12
13
14
15

MR. BARLOW:

Well , there is no judgment for

the Court to take away from the jury on that.
THE COURT:

But there was a judgment because

the jury did :not find fraud or invasion of privacy •

16

MR. BARLOW:

17

THE COURT:

18

invasion of p rivacy.

19

the opini on that now I have to go on to the questi on of

20

conspirac y-

21

MR. BARLOW:

That 's correct.
I am now finding fraud and
And in finding that, then I am of

It seems to me, your Honor, that

22

matter was presented to the Court in Mr. Jensen's motion

23

for a directed verdict, and the Court denied it.

24

matter ha s be en ruled on by this Court.

25

THE COURT:

That

I don 't believe so.
23

MR. JENSEN:

1

Maybe we can resolve that, your

2

Honor.

3

that the special verdict read is that any liability of

4

GAB would be based on the underlying wrongful act of

5

invasion of privacy or fraud.

6

neither one of those have been established, that the

7

question of conspiracy we didn't reach it.

Since the jury found that

We can probably resolve that if the plaintiff

8
9

The reason that the conspiracy claim -- the way

were willing to voluntarily dismiss the claim of

10

conspiracy against GAB.

I would simply just have to

11

talk to my client about that.
I think I could say if that claim of

12
13

conspiracy, and we agree that the conspiracy claim

14

against GAB might be dismissed —

15

Inteltech would agree to that; I think they would have

16

an opportunity if they wanted to bring GAB back in for a

17

determination of whether or not GAB is at all on the

18

hook for any of this $8,000 -- but I think our position

19

would be under the circumstances that we would dismiss,

20

based on the Court's rulings, dismiss the claim against

21

GAB for conspiracy and simply move to collect the

22

judgment against Inteltech.

23
24
25

I don't know if

MR. BARLOW:

Well, are you moving for that

MR. JENSEN:

I can't do that without talking

now?

24

to my client.
MR. BARLOW:

I am requesting for a ruling

right now.
THE COURT:
to rule this way:
back.

I'm making a ruling.

I am going

As I say -- first of all, let me go

I don f t remember completely the motion for a
I remember I took two motions under

directed verdict.
advisement.

I took them under advisement

because I was

of the opinion there was no way the jury cannot f ind on
those matters.
shouldn't.

But I got surprised.

And maybe I

Maybe I should have ruled at the time , but I

didn't.
I am of the opinion, and I am going to state
this -- and maybe you can state some law and I am wrong
and you'll have to revise it -- but I am of the o pinion
that there was conspiracy.

That the elements of

conspiracy were met as far as the five elements set
forth in the jury instructions are concerned.

I am of

the opinion that Oak Norton, himself, he knew what his
individuals were doing, his employees were doing.
he approved it.

And

And that he, himself, could even be

personally liable.
I am convinced that Inteltech was the agent
-- or was it the other way around?

Yeah.

Intelt ech was

the agent of GAB and GAB indicated that they knew what
25

1

Inteltech was doing and how they were conducting their

2

business.
That's my best recollection.

3

As I said at

4

the outset, some of m y memory is a little hazy on the

5

facts

6

testified they knew h ow they were conducting an d what

7

they were doing.

My best recollection is that GAB's

MR. BARLOW:

8
9

THE COURT:

Yes.

That's what I say, I

Yes.

am go ing way opposite to the jury.
Now, maybe I am saying something here I don't

12
13

You are ignoring the instruction

on ag ency and subcontractors?

10
11

individuals

have the authority to get into.

But I am of th e

f
14 | opinion that it doesn t need a new trial.

And I don't

15 1 know -- well, I am not going to grant an alternative
16

right now.

I think I am going to grant it as I have

17

indie ated and deny a motion for a new trial.
MR. STEVENS

18

Your Honor, you listed some

19

damag es.

20

granting attorney's f ees.

21

that you would reach this particular point so I didn» t

22

bring the Complaint.

23

that.

24

award •

25

Then I thin k I heard you also say you were
I obviously didn't e xpect

I don't remember a claim for

And I am wonde ring what the basis is for that

THE COURT:

And I should have checked that.
26

1

And you may b<a absolutely right.

2

attorney fees under the provision of 78- —

3

is.

4

MR. BARLOW:

5

THE COURT:

6

8

Bad faith?
Yeah, as far as the -- well, not

MR. BARLOW:

Yes.

I spent six days in Judge

Rigtrupfs court this past summer on that.
If it only goes to bad faith, I

THE COURT:

9
10

whatever it

Does that go to bad faith?

bad faith.

7

I am talking about

would have to reverse myself because I did not review

11 | the statute.

I think this was a highly offensive

12

situation where the p erson is entitled to attorney

13

fees.

14

whatever it is, only goes to bad faith, I would have to

15

deny myself and deny attorney fees since there is no

16

request made :for them •

And if attorney fees are not pled for and 78-,

MR. STEVENS

17
18

there is to be a new trial?
THE COURT:

19
20
21

So is the order of the Court

No.

I am denying the motion for a

new trial.
MR. BARLOW:

May I also understand again the

22

$3,000 punitive damag es and $5,000 general damages and

23

$20 of special damage s are to be paid by both

24

defendants?

25

THE COURT:

I am not making that
27

I am ruling and ordering how I looked at

1

determination

2

the evidence.

3

conspiracy is , the way that I found that there was an

4

agency, then :E think the chips fall where they do.

The wa y the evidence is, the way the

MR. STEVENS

5

Are you saying, your Honor, that

6

my <client wou.Id owe those amounts and that Mr. Barlow f s

7

cli(ents would also owe those amounts, double recovery?
THE COURT:

8
9

MR. BARLOW:

11

THE COURT:

13

This is joint.

That's

the total amount.

10

12

No, no.

So it is joint?
Oh, yes, if you are asking me

that.
MR. BARLOW:

I am trying to understand if

14 1 between the two defendants we owe these damages.
15

THE COURT:

16

MR. BARLOW:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. STEVENS

Yes.
According to the Court'si order.
Yes.
And if I understand correctly,

19

you have also included Oak Norton individually on that;

20

is 'that correct?

21

THE COURT:

I say that Oak Norton -- all of

22

it, $8,000 total -- a nd that Oak Norton I said that he

23

knew what was going on as far as his employees going out

24

and making those fraudulent misrepresentations.

25

Any other questions?
28

1

I didn*'t understand your question,

2

Mr. Barlow, when you said each one of you.

3

saying that.

4I

Okay.

No, I am not

Court's in recess.

5

(This concludes these proceedings.)

6

*

* *

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
29
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C E R T I F I C A T E

2 | STATE OF UTAH

)

3

)

4

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

I, SUZANNE WARNICK, CSR, RPR-CM, do certify

5

that I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered

6

Professional Reporter with the Certificate of Merit, and

7

Notary Public in and for the State of Utah.

8
9

That at the time and place of the proceedings
in the foregoing matter, I appeared as the court

10

reporter in the Third Judicial District Court, for the

11

Honorable Judge Homer F. Wilkinson, and thereat reported

12

in stenotype all of the proceedings had therein;

13

That thereafter, my said shorthand notes of

14I the Motion for Judgement Notwithstanding the Verdict and
15

for a New Trial were transcribed by computer into the

16

foregoing pages; and that this constitutes a full, true

17

and correct transcript of the same.

18
19

WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake
City, Utah, this 30th day of May, 1990.

20

2i I

^J\M2£L4UaJL~.IdJE^jLCjOk
Suzan/tjft W a r n i c k ,

CSR, RPR-CM

22 '
23

24 ,
My commission expires:
25 I 1 April 1991.
30

ADDENDUM:

B

GORDON K. JENSEN - A4J5 3
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JACKIE TURNER,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs .
GENERAL ADJUSTMENT BUREAU,
INC., a Delaware corporation;
DENNIS DYE; RONNIE HYER;
OAK NORTON, INTELDEX
CORPORATION, d/b/a
Intel tech Services;

Civil No. C87-5401

Judge Homer Wilkinson
Defendants.

This case was tried to a jury on March 12-14, 1990
before

the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson.

Before trial, the

plaintiff James Turner voluntarily dismissed all claims against
all

defendants.

dismissed
their

During

her claims

individual

trial, the

plaintiff

Jackie

Turner

against Dennis Dye and Ronnie Hyer, in

capacities.

dismissed

his

counterclaim

Turner.

The

jury

returned

During

ayainst
a

trial,

James

verdict

Turner

for

finding no fraud and no invasion of privacy.

the

Oak
and

Norton
Jackie

defendants,

The plaintiff's

Motion

for Judgment

Notwithstanding

the Verdict and Motion for A New Trial came before the Court
for hearing on May 4, 1990.
plaintiff.

Gordon K. Jensen represented the

Craig L. Barlow represented the defendant General

Adjustment Bureau ("GAB") and Robert L. Stevens and Michael L.
Schwab
Based

represented

the defendants

on the evidence

arguments

of

the

Inteltech

and

at trial, the pleadings

parties,

the

stipulations

Oak Norton.
on

of

file, the

the

parties

before and during trial, and good cause appearing;
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.
defendants

The plaintiff James Turner's claims against all
are

dismissed

with

prejudice

plaintiff

Jackie

Turner's

pursuant

to

stipulation;
2.

The

claims

against

Dennis Dye and Ronnie Hyer, in their individual capacities, are
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to stipulation;
3.
James

Turner

The defendant Oak Norton's counterclaim against
and

Jackie

Turner

is dismissed

with

prejudice

pursuant to stipulation;
4.

The plaintiff Jackie Turner's Motion for a New

Trial is denied;
5.

The

plaintiff

Jackie

Turner's

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is granted.
2

Motion

for

Judgment is

entered against Inteltech on Jackie Turner's fraud and invasion
of privacy claims as follows:
Out-of-Pocket Damages
General Damages
Punitive Damages
TOTAL
6.
Jackie
jointly

$

20.00
5,000.00
3,000 . 00

$ 8,020.00

Judgment is entered against Inteltech and GAB on

Turner's

conspiracy

responsible

claim.

to Jackie Turner

Inteltech

and

GAB

are

for the amount of this

Judgment.
7.

Oak Norton is personally liable to Jackie Turner

for the amount of this Judgment.
8.

The plaintiff is awarded post judgment interest

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4, accruing at a rate of 12%
per annum.
9.

The plaintiff is awarded her costs of court as

determined pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
A*s^^__
DATED this JL /
day eft May, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

HOMER F. WILKINSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

ADDENDUM:

C

iL'

ROBERT L. STEVENS [A3105]
MICHAEL L. SCHWAB [A4662]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendants
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JAMES TURNER and JACKIE TURNER,
J U D G M E N T
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. C87-5401
GENERAL ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC.,
DENNIS DYE, RONNIE HYER, OAK
NORTON, INTELDEX CORPORATION,
dba INTELTECH SERVICES,

Judge Homer Wilkinson

Defendants,
This action came on for trial March 12-14, 1990,
before the Court and a jury, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
presiding.

Prior to trial, plaintiff James Turner voluntarily

dismissed all claims against all defendants.

During trial,

plaintiff Jackie Turner dismissed her claims against Dennis
Dye and Ronnie Hyer, and Oak Norton voluntarily dismissed
his counterclaim against James Turner and Jackie Turner.

The issues were duly tried and the jury answered the
special verdict submitted to it as follows:
1.

By clear and convincing evidence did
the defendant Inteltech commit fraud
upon the plaintiff, Jackie Turner,
as that cause of action has been
explained in these instructions?
Yes

No

^

By a preponderance of the evidence,
did the defendant Inteltech invade
the privacy of the plaintiff, Jackie
Turner, as that cause of action has
been explained in these instructions?
Yes

No

X

The issues in this case having been duly tried and
the jury having rendered its verdict,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
1.

That plaintiff James Turner's claims against

all defendants be dismissed with prejudice pursuant
to stipulation;
2.

That plaintiff Jackie Turner's claims

against Dennis Dye and Ronnie Hyer, in their
individual capacity, be dismissed with prejudice
pursuant to stipulation;
3.

That defendant Oak Norton's counterclaim

against James and Jackie Turner be dismissed with
prejudice pursuant to stipulation; and
4.

That Jackie Turner's claims against all

remaining defendants be dismissed as no cause of

a c t

in n

H i I In i HI ( j m l 1 r e

.ill in I i HI I

1 111 >

HIP

I J t »p

the detendaiits recover

from tli»j> p l a i n t i l t

Turner, t h e i r c o s t s of

action.

DATED t h i s 2!lLZ day <: >f S r e e k ,

1 990

BY THE COURT:

i in I I h , i I

Jackie

